Thursday, July 9, 2009

What Kenyan Ministers are Driving Now

With public pressure on to cut down on generous car allowances, Ministers in Kenya have been debating strategies to cut back... without compromising luxury.

The 2009 budget sets aside 70 million shillings (US$ 914,434) for vehicle spending based on a long-standing practice of providing a Mercedes-Benz to go along with the title of minister. Anticipating resistance from ministers, Kenyan Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta suggested last month that ministers’ automotive choices be limited to those vehicles with engine capacities of under 1800ccs.

What car did he have in mind? Kenyan newspaper The Daily Nation assumes “a 1796cc Mercedes Benz E- Class. The engine is small, but the luxury (not to mention the price tag) is exactly how ministers like it: Big.”

This week, conscious of the public’s eye on extravagant government spending, President Kibaki suspended a State House official, J.K. Mutua, for authorizing the purchase of a new presidential fleet of Mercedes limos without his personal approval. This publicity-stunt sends a message of self-regulation without the substance to back it.

The Daily Nation reports that this type of spending does not need presidential approval. By law, authorization must come from the comptroller, not the president. The problem is that the comptroller's position, which is subject to presidential appointment and approval, has been vacant since 2008, leaving little monitoring of government spending for executive or legislative goodies.

The President’s quick suspension of Mutua served as a very public action, acknowledging Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta’s view that “to [Kenyans], a Mercedes is a Mercedes and it is expensive ... as a government, that is not the kind of image we want to pass on to Kenyans” (as quoted by the Daily Nation). To this end, Kenyatta has been driving a VW Passat since his June directive to promote government officials as more populist and in-touch with Kenyan realities.

The government’s image may be pieced together for now, but the larger weakness remains. A finance official’s suspension is not an acceptable solution for the lack of a national comptroller: Mutua serves as a momentary scapegoat while the spending budget for government officials continues to go largely unmonitored.

-- Norah Mallaney

-- Mercedes-Benz E-class image by ChalieJ/Flickr (cc by/nc/sa)


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Governance Metrics: Why “Fictitious” Numbers Can Be Useful

What do Stalinist-era accounting practices in Hungary, financial reports, and post-WWII US property tax assessments have in common with measuring governance/corruption? More than we think, if we take the argument advanced by a former professor of mine Martha Lampland seriously.

In a working paper (PDF) published recently, Lampland (a historical anthropologist) suggests that numbers are accorded many meanings that vary greatly depending on how they are used in different science and policy domains.

The full paper is here:
"False Numbers as Formalizing Practices" by Martha Lampland

In particular, she distinguishes between provisional numbers and false numbers. Provisional numbers are just that: temporary metrics that can be useful tools for strategizing and planning. They serve as heuristic techniques and important benchmarks, even though they may appear to be stable entities in particular situations. False numbers subordinate relative accuracy to the accomplishment of other tasks and objectives. Making this analytic distinction allows her to show that numbers and quantitative measurement tools do not always have to be scientifically precise in order for them to be effective and practical.

Drawing on the work of other academicians, Lampland presents several vivid historical and contemporary examples to substantiate her claim about provisional numbers. The usage of quarterly financial reports, for instance, frequently relies on temporary metrics to make forecasts of potential trends in the market.

Another setting for the efficacious role of temporary numbers is the U.S. tax code. Isaac Martin has shown recently that property tax assessments were calibrated not with market prices but rather with local jurisdictions as well as voting and political alliances. The decoupling of market real estate values and taxation rates therefore served the interests of county tax authorities and tax payers. The tax revolts of the early 1970s were rebelling against the court-ordered movement to standardize tax rates.

Lampland’s own study of agrarian work science in prewar capitalist and socialist Hungary lends rich empirical support to her notion of false numbers. She shows how party officials during the Stalinist era strived to modernize the economy and society by increasing labor productivity, but were hampered by farmers’ indifference to formal/written bookkeeping and accounting procedures that were conceived by the socialist bureaucracy to document labor activities.

To remedy this deficiency, the Stalinist state embarked on a systematic campaign to teach bookkeeping in agricultural communities, held sporadic labor competitions, and thrust reluctant industrial workers upon equally reluctant cooperative farmers so that the former could review and correct the accounting practices of the “benighted” villager. In all of this, the party apparatus tolerated numerical discrepancies in written records early on because they were useful benchmarks of progress, learning, and the accumulation of knowledge, rather than misleading signs that were “bad” and “wrong.” (Over time, however, the level of tolerance diminished as the state increasingly punished those implicated in accounting misrepresentation.)

I recommend reading this piece, then, because it prods those of us in the governance and corruption indices business to take a step back and reflect more critically on how people actually construct and make use of numbers in context. Lampland’s material sheds light on why and how numerical indicators are not always fixed, stable signs that make claims to verisimilitude and definitive status. Rather, quantifiable measures can in certain situations be estimates that -- precisely because of their provisional and malleable character -- provide useful entry points to making more informed and discrete judgments, strategizing, and policy making.

Misreading provisional numbers obscures the social contexts in which they can be:

powerful tools and meaningful signs, despite their ephemeral character. They constitute forecasting benchmarks for investing in financial markets. They have formed the basis of tax schedules, while strengthening the ability of government officials to respond promptly to the demands of constituents. Provisional numbers enable scientists to think creatively about a problem: model its possible contours, consider various configurations, prompt new answers. In each instance, crucial tasks are achieved; significant investment in form has occurred. And in each instance, the actions devoted to formalizing practices are necessarily recursive, that is, they must be repeated over and over again to achieve the task at hand [quoting Lampland].

Take the Integrity Scorecard of our Global Integrity Report, for instance, as viewed from the perspective of a user. The Report assesses the existence and effectiveness of public integrity laws, institutions, and accountability mechanisms as well as citizen access to such mechanisms -- the ingredients that make up the foundation of a country’s good governance and anti-corruption architecture -- based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches.

The lead researcher assigns aggregate numerical scores to six major categories and twenty-three sub-categories that are generated from more than 300 indicators. In turn, these scores are used to produce an overall country score. (For more details on our methodology, see our Methodology White Paper.) These numbers can provide the user with a snapshot of how a particular agency or legal regulation functions and performs in a particular country.

But the numbers alone are likely to be more limited in their utility if, say, the user wants detailed information to identify specific areas of reform for planning purposes. Since the Integrity Scorecard complements quantitative figures with qualitative narratives, users are provided with a broader contextual analysis that can enable such data to be more “actionable.” The numerical scores found in the Global Integrity Report -- or other indices similar to it -- can thus be viewed as provisional numbers (in Lampland’s sense) if they are used as an entry point or benchmark for further analysis and planning.

The bigger point I wish to make is that we shouldn’t fetishize and get hung up on numbers per se when designing or using measurement instruments. This in no way implies that we should sacrifice rigor and accuracy when crafting and interpreting numbers. It is, however, a reminder that “the science of measuring corruption is more an art form than a precisely defined empirical process” (see our book A Users’ Guide to Measuring Corruption).

-- Raymond June


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Tuesday, June 30, 2009

600 Words on Governance but No Mention of Policy, People or Politics

If a country score on a Washington analyst's spreadsheet nudges from -0.79 to -0.75, should anyone care? Maybe not. In fact, here's a case where the appearance of insight provided by functionally hollow numbers is filling up a space that could be used to discuss actual governance issues.

Call it governance theater. It's as staged as a kabuki dance, and even more predictable: Player one is the respected international institution. Player two is the time-pressed journalist, who wants to write about corruption, but preferably without having to risk her neck or make a lot of phone calls.

Player one, the researchers, are using methods so dense and seemingly mysterious that it's hard to find a journalist who can even vaguely describe the source data or methods used to generate the results. Player two is just happy it all sounds official, and really doesn't want to know much more than that about the methodology.

The real example here is the brand new 2008 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which we discussed here. The WGI are the most widely used source of governance data. In the role of Player Two in this production is GMA News, a Filipino news outlet.

In a story published yesterday, a GMA reporter dissects the WGI results for the Philippines at length -- some 600 words. The inevitable comparisons are there: wow, the Philippines scored the same as [insert really poor country]. Like this:

This year's ranking was a marginal improvement from negative 0.79 in 2007.The same score was received by the Union of the Comoros, which is located off the eastern coast of Africa on the northern end of the Mozambique Channel. About half of its 798,000 population live on less than $1.25 a day.
And then:
The Philippines’ neighbors fared better in their anti-corruption measures with Thailand, -0.38; Malaysia, 0.14; Indonesia, -0.64, and Singapore, 2.34. Only Vietnam got a worse score than the Philippines at -0.76.

I get the news hook here -- I'm not above a little of that on this very blog. But the kicker isn't what's in the story: it's what's left out. Take a look at the story again.

Notice anything missing? How about anti-corruption policy? Any anti-corruption policy? Or a politician involved in corruption. Or an anti-corruption reform platform. Or political movements working on the issue. Or the sense at any point that the Philippines scores were based on something specific, a set of observations that may or may not inform decisions about anti-corruption policy.

The WGI press release admittedly offers little in the way of specifics to our intrepid and time-pressed reporter:
"When governance is improved by one standard deviation, infant mortality declines by two-thirds and incomes rise about three-fold in the long run."
Not exactly in-the-weeds stuff for Filipino readers. There's no sense in the story of what, if anything, would improve those scores in the Philippines, or even why they are the way they are.

There's got to be a better way...

I'm reluctant to put the blame for this mess on the WGI authors: we get some crazy stuff written about our work too, and there's nothing we can do about it.

But the data itself, in the way it’s presented as more science and less an imperfect art, contributes to this. We need more than numbers, or we're going to keep getting these vapid, meaningless stories. Sure, that -0.75 country score comes from somewhere, and all the supporting documentation and spreadsheets are on file if you dig deep enough. But in practice, it's so abstract that few people outside of Western aid agencies and think tanks know where it comes from, much less what it implies for specific policy choices.

This makes me crazy. Because it's a lost opportunity to actually educate people about their options and empower them to plot a way forward.

Global Integrity has tried to lay out a different way -- a way that links policy choices and ongoing debates directly to the information being produced. For the theory of this, you can read A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption. The issues of actionability and abstraction are the core themes of the book.

In practice, we've got our Global Integrity Report, and our new Local Integrity Initiatives. They aren't perfect by any means, but we're trying -- every source datapoint is right there on the website, with narrative and references and dissenting opinions. And we publish journalistic, no-numbers qualitative reporting alongside all of that data on the very same issues. The work itself is a shopping list for potential points of intervention. And sometimes, we get really great insights from reporters using that data.

But we still put out an index, with a top to bottom ranking, and it drives an awful lot of press for us. It's the same with the Corruption Perceptions Index for Transparency International: it's a devastatingly effective PR tool (note the index-release traffic spikes). But I'm starting to think I just can't do it anymore. I can't keep pretending these country rankings are worth talking about.

-- Jonathan Eyler-Werve


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Prime Minister of Timor-Leste Accused of Corruption

Last week, Radio Australia broke the news that Xanana Gusmão, the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, approved a multi-million dollar government contract to a company in which the PM’s daughter is a shareholder. This major case of alleged nepotism is catching all the headlines, but Radio Australia reporters uncovered other cases of alleged corruption and favoritism among Timor-Leste’s political elite.

Radio Australia reports that in 2008, Gusmão approved provided US$3.5 million in government funding to Prima Foods. His daughter’s investment in the company appears to put Gusmão in direct violation of conflict of interest regulations. Joao Goncalves, the Minister of Economic Development, was also targeted by Radio Australia for three contracts given to companies in which his wife is a part-owner. Café Pacific, a Pacific-focused free media blog, highlights the disappointment this brings in East Timor where Gusmão is a national liberation hero and a champion of many of the nation’s recent corruption reforms.

In 2007, the Global Integrity Report: Timor-Leste showed procurement regulations as one of the few strong spots in the nation’s anti-corruption framework. While the scorecard cites concern with the infrequency of investigations and penalties, there is clearly a robust anti-corruption system in place. Gusmão and other recent national procurement scandals highlight the credibility of this regulatory system, suggesting that when investigations do occur, conflict of interest laws can be employed to prosecute fraudulent acts. More fundamentally, in many countries handing a prime government contact to a family member is perfectly legal. Not here.

Whether or not these regulations will be used against Gusmão and other violators remains unknown.

It seems that those in power are sticking together and remaining largely silent. Gusmão has not spoken publicly but today, the President of Timor-Leste, Jose Ramos Horta released a statement in full support of the PM: "Just because someone became president, became prime minister, became a minister, does not mean his family all have to go into unemployment, all have to sell their business and stop."

Clearly, Ramos-Horta is missing the point. Conflict of interest safeguards are not meant to financially cripple the family members of government officials; but they are expected to eliminate any unfair advantages that come with an association with those in power and safeguard public trust in the process.

If the political will exists, Gusmão might be made an example of by his own anti-corruption agenda, serving as the ultimate model for anti-corruption reform.

-- Norah Mallaney


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Monday, June 29, 2009

Fresh Data: Worldwide Governance Indicators

The latest round of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) were released today under the auspices of... we’re not entirely sure. Ownership issues aside, the WGI remain the most widely used governance data in the world.

Previously an effort of the World Bank Institute under Dani Kaufman’s leadership, “The WGI are [now] produced by: Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institution, Aart Kraay, World Bank Development Economics Research Group, [and] Massimo Mastruzzi, World Bank Institute.” Except that, “The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.”

A primary feature of the WGI is their near global coverage, thanks to the use of dozens of disparate surveys and expert assessments as component data, including Global Integrity data. We've discussed the use and potential misuse of the WGI at some length in our book, A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption.

And once again, the Worldwide Governance Indicators can be found here.

I wanted to take the opportunity to thank the WGI authors (especially Aart and Massimo) for making two adjustments to the use of Global Integrity data in the WGI at our request. To quote their documentation:

One…

“At the request of Global Integrity, we have dropped the 2003 round [note: we call this our “2004 data”] of the Global Integrity Index from our indicators for 2003, 2004, and 2005, as there were changes in Global Integrity’s methodology between the first and subsequent rounds of this exercise, making the first round not fully comparable with subsequent rounds.”

This dovetails with the warnings we have made explicit for the past two years about compatibility issues between our 2004 data and newer data.

Two…

“Note that in 2007 & 2008 we have carried forward [Global Integrity] scores for those countries that were covered in previous years but not in the current year.”

We had asked that the authors document their practice of “flatlining” data (my term, not theirs) for years in which data sources (such as Global Integrity) did not carry out fieldwork but for which the WGI report the existence of data. Without disclosure of this, we felt the practice was easily misinterpreted to mean the authors had new source material when none existed.

Not sure whether you should care about these changes? Check out our A Users’ Guide to Measuring Corruption to beef up your methodological know-how.

-- Nathaniel Heller


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Global Integrity Report: 2009 - Country List

The fieldwork for the Global Integrity Report: 2009 is underway, and we're happy to announce our target countries for the upcoming year. The big news this year is that we are splitting our 70 target countries into two groups, which we will alternate on even and odd years in a two-year rotation.

You can see the country coverage in the 2004 pilot and 2006-2008 reports on the Global Integrity Report site. As always suggestions and criticism from our readers are welcome.

Our new core 70 countries rotating on a biennial cycle

The Global Integrity Report: 2009 will be the first in a series of more standardized rounds of future national-level fieldwork. Starting this year, we will begin to cover a core set of 70 countries on a biennial basis, covering half the first year and the other half the next year. This means that the approximately 35 countries chosen for 2009 will be covered again in the Global Integrity Report: 2011, 2013 and so on. The even years (2010, 2012, etc) will have the same pattern of coverage with a separate list of 35. In addition to these 70 countries, we expect that each year we will also include 5-10 countries of interest in addition to the core rotating cluster.

Over the past three annual cycles, we have observed that most countries' data stay relatively constant over a 12-month period. This reflects the reality that anti-corruption reforms can take decades before fully taking root. By allowing for a full year off between assessments, we expect that the Global Integrity Report will more usefully capture each country's progress. These somewhat smaller biennial samples will also allow us to shift resources towards scaling up our Local Integrity Initiative efforts in parallel to ongoing Global Integrity Report fieldwork.

Countries to be covered in 2009 include:

Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bosnia
Brazil
China
Colombia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Jordan
Kenya
Kosovo
Lebanon
Liberia
Macedonia
Malawi
Mexico
Mongolia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Norway
Rwanda
Serbia
Sierra Leone
South Korea
Tajikistan
Trinidad
Uganda
Ukraine
United States
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zimbabwe

How did we choose these 36 countries?

One extremely important criterion in our country selection process is the strength and availability of our in-country teams: Global Integrity's international network of local anti-corruption experts. The Global Integrity Report is created by our in-country experts who conduct interviews, compile data, write journalistic stories, and review their respective country assessments prior to publication. These 36 countries represent places where we have strong teams that are available to work with us in 2009.

In addition, beginning in 2009 we wanted to attempt to more systematically cover a "global" sample of countries each year. As such, we looked at the regional diversity of countries, population figures, and national income levels. It would be impossible for us to precisely replicate the worldwide distribution of those criteria in our small sample. However, as part of our new two-year biannual sample of 70 countries, we have attempted to include countries that roughly match global income, geographic, and population distributions, including the top fifteen most populated nations in the world.

Countries to be covered in 2010 include:

Albania
Angola
Argentina
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Hungary
Italy
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Malaysia
Moldova
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Somalia
South Africa
Tanzania
Thailand
Turkey
West Bank and Gaza
Yemen

-- Nathaniel Heller and Global Integrity


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Friday, June 26, 2009

Introducing Indaba: RFP for New Research Technology

Global Integrity is seeking bids for the design and build of Indaba, a new browser-based research platform. Indaba will be the Global Integrity's third generation of research software allowing rapid, flexible collaboration on research and reporting.

A bit about Global Integrity and technology...

Global Integrity works in 100+ countries via hundreds of contributors supported by a small core staff. We're able to do this because we're strategic: we tap into and support existing local anti-corruption networks, rather than replicating them.

Our diverse contributors need a way to collaborate. For this, we use a very cool technology platform that allows researchers and reporters to submit, share, edit and critique content from any Internet café worldwide. These days this approach is popular: it's called "cloud computing" or "software as a service" or "crowdsourcing." When we started doing this in 2001, we didn't have a name for it -- we just thought it might work.

It works. We have people in Sudan, Iraq, Cambodia working together online, building sophisticated databases via a web browser. It works pretty well: in the last three years, we've published roughly three million words of original research. That's the wordcount equivalent of the entire Harry Potter series, every six months.

About the Indaba RFP...

We've outgrown our existing system, as Global Integrity looks beyond national anti-corruption efforts to dig into local and sector issues. Increasingly, partner groups are looking to us not just for methodology and subject matter knowledge, but for our technology. We need a platform that can adapt instantly to these new demands.

So, we're starting from scratch. And we're looking for help.

Do you know a quality web/database shop that can help us? If so, please send them to this RFP, which includes much more detail on our vision for Indaba. Thanks as always for your suggestions and support.

-- Jonathan Eyler-Werve


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Thursday, June 25, 2009

USA: New Data on Statehouse Financial Disclosures

The Center for Public Integrity updates its decade long series on US statehouse legislative disclosures. The data is published in a new report States of Disclosure. Twenty of fifty states get failing grades for their financial disclosures, and three US states -- Idaho, Michigan, Vermont -- require no financial disclosures whatsoever.

They've got a nice map of the results.

This data is particularly striking when you contrast to our national level data on the subject in the Global Integrity Report. For instance, among the 50 diverse countries we studied last year, the only countries with similarly lax no-disclosure-required rules are Angola, Cambodia, China, Ethiopia and Somalia. Seeing a pattern here?

Vermont: grade-A maple syrup, and Somalia-grade financial disclosures.

There's lots more data in the Center's report that will be game-changing useful for local advocates fighting for more detailed, accurate disclosure forms. But it's also great for snarking at the states that aren't even trying, like Idaho: Angola of the West.

Michigan: where the statehouse financial data are worse than Kazakhstan... just like the roads.

Snark: it's so much easier than constructive solutions! If you'd like to play along, you can download our raw data here. No spreadsheet from CPI, but their results are here. Do let us know if you find anything interesting.

Family heritage...

The Center for Public Integrity's current statehouse report was an early inspiration for the Global Integrity Report scorecards, back in 2001.

I'm pretty sure no one working on the current update was there for that, but the granular, line-by-line analysis in their scorecard was a model for the early Global Integrity pilot work, which was started as a project of the Center for Public Integrity. We've since gone independent, and developed beyond those early pilots, but the family resemblance between the Center's methods and our own are still there. And because the data are unpacked and transparent, quick comparisons across datasets like the ones above are easy and valid (whether it's useful or fair to compare Vermont to Somalia at all is another issue).

I'd also like to point out that the Center website has never looked better. Nice work, folks.

-- Jonathan Eyler-Werve


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Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Indonesia's Rosa Parks: A Defamation Charge Launches a National Outcry

An Indonesian woman sends an email to a friend complaining of poor medical treatment at a private hospital. After the email leaked, the 32-year-old mother of two is arrested and faces six years in an Indonesian jail for alleged defamation. Her case is sparking a national outcry over corruption and favoritism in judicial outcomes.

As Indonesia prepares for a presidential election on July 8th, the case has become a rally point for frustrations with a judicial system that critics say (including our Global Integrity Report: Indonesia) often favors the rich and connected over the rule of law.

Reuters reported yesterday on the case against Prita Mulyasari, an Indonesian mother who was hospitalized with mumps earlier this year. She was dissatisfied with the service she received at Omni International Hospital, a private institution, and complained in an email to one of her friends. The email leaked onto the internet and Ms. Mulyasari was fined $30,000 and charged with defamation.

She had been incarcerated while awaiting trial but has been released after journalists and and Indonesian citizens online took up her cause. At press time, a Facebook group in support of Prita had 94,116 members.

If convicted, she could receive as much as six years jail time.

Giving that the presidential election is less than a month away, all candidates have voiced their opinion on the matter. Current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (seeking reelection), spoke out for the need of fairness and transparency in the application of all laws in a recent televised debate. The current Vice President, Jusuf Kalla (also up for election) spoke with the police chief, and finally, the opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri visited Ms. Mulyasari while she was still behind bars.

All of this shows that corruption, both in the judiciary system and out, will play a large role in the upcoming elections. This is all the more emphasized because of a scandal earlier this year, in which the president of Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was arrested for allegedly murdering an executive.

A key element of this case is the practice of pre-trial detention, a flashpoint for corruption and inequitable treatment. Global Integrity will be looking closely at this issue worldwide later this year. Stay tuned.

-- Jessica Mahoney


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Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Iran’s Internet Snooping is Made in America

In the days following Iran’s contested presidential Iran's Internet speed slowed to a tenth of its normal speed. What’s causing the slow-down? Western-developed technology that allows the Iranian government to analyze networks of information: who is transmitting, what exactly they are saying, and who is consuming it.

While Iran grabs headlines, the US Congress is quietly debating whether to continue use of similar technology against Americans. The US government has been intercepting and storing private emails and online reading habits of US citizens since at least 2001.

Iran's Online Spying...

This process is known as deep packet inspection, a technology developed and sold to the Iranian government by a joint venture of European companies Siemens and Nokia. Deep packet inspection is also allegedly used by the Chinese government. But unlike the layered “Great Firewall” of China, the Iranian technology is centralized at one point. This means that all information trading must be analyzed at a single location, leading to sluggish Internet speeds nationwide when monitoring increases.

Iran’s Internet slow-down has not yet meant an Internet shut-down: a move that would crush foreign and domestic media’s close-to real-time reporting on the election protests and vivid eyewitness accounts (although social networks and SMS have been blocked at times). For more analysis on Iran’s use of deep packet inspection, see yesterday’s Wall St. Journal.

As we have seen in other countries, Internet censorship is being coupled with the more traditional forms of media repression: Reporters Sans Frontieres describes Iran this week as "the world’s biggest prison for journalists" with a total of 33 journalists and online activists in jail. RSF details individual cases here.

UPDATE: Nokia Siemens Networks statement on "provision of lawful intercept capability" in Iran states they provide voice intercept capability only, not Internet filtering tech, disputing Wall Street Journal account.

-- by Norah Mallaney

We're All Iranians Now: US Online Spying...

Deep packet inspection and similar techniques being used in Iran are also being employed aggressively by the United States government, ostensibly in its search for terrorists online.

The US National Security Agency has a legal charter to spy on foreigners online. Unfortunately Internet traffic is nearly impossible to sort by nationality of user, meaning the NSA is snooping on all US Web and email traffic and storing it, with the cooperation of US telecoms companies. This has been extensively documented in court cases filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, including testimony from an AT&T cable technician who worked on dragnet hardware spliced into the Internet backbone cables routed through downtown San Francisco. The technician, Mark Klein, has testified in court that the hardware made copies of the website preferences and email traffic of all AT&T customers and sent them to the NSA. The government did not dispute this.

The NSA has portrayed the collection of domestic email as limited, inadvertent and unavoidable, but every new trickle of information shows a more robust and aggressive domestic spying capability. As covered by the New York Times, Congress is quietly debating what to do about this, but the frame of debate is not encouraging for fans of limited government. New York Times:

“For the Hill, the issue is a sense of scale, about how much domestic e-mail collection is acceptable,” a former intelligence official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because N.S.A. operations are classified. “It’s a question of how many mistakes they can allow.”
While I might be comfortable classifying a massive government mail-reading system a "mistake," I dispute the suggestion that the creation of a secret, unaccountable system to intercept, sort and store records of all US email and online reading habits was somehow accidental. This is a matter of policy, and it's being conducted with little Congressional awareness, much less informed public debate. Not good.

For more on this topic, see the Electronic Frontier Foundation on spying; the Open Net Initiative on filtering; and Sesawe on countermeasures.

-- by Jonathan Eyler-Werve

-- image by Xeni Jardin (cc by/nc/sa)


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